

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 /083 R

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/IR: LFISCHER

APPROVED BY: ACDA/IR: AFLOYD

NSC: MHIGGINS

JCS: CALDERMAN

ISA: JMORRISON

PM: VBAKER

EUR/RPM: GCHRISTIANSON

C: WSHINN

ACDA/IR: THIRSCHFELD

S/S: LCJOHNSTONE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 132088

C O R R E C T E D COPY FOR GARBLED TEXT PARA 11

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO,MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: COMMENTS ON DUTCH PAPER ON OPTION III (NOTAL)

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REF: A. STATE 31553, B. STATE 87907, C. STATE A-103

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON DUTCH PAPER ON OPTION III (REFTEL C). YOU SHOULD PASS THEM TO THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF THE DUTCH FO WHEN YOU HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED BY USNATO THAT THE DUTCH HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON OPTION III.

2. BEGIN TEXT: WE ARE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF DUTCH STUDY OF THE DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX SUBJECT. IN GENERAL, NETHERLANDS OBSERVATIONS PARALLELED OUR OWN ANALYSIS AND WERE USEFUL IN OUR OWN CONSIDERATION OF OPTION III ISSUES. OUR STUDIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND THE VIEWS CONTAINED HEREIN REFLECT US CONCLUSIONS, WHICH ARE BEING SUBMITTED TO NATO.

3. SPECIFICALLY, LIKE YOURSELVES, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT SOME ALTERATION OF THE CURRENT WESTERN MBFR POSITION WILL BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD OBTAINING OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE ADDITION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SEEMS TO BE THE MOST FRUITFUL MEANS TO THIS END. AN OFFER OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, COUPLED WITH PROVISION FOR COVERING AIR MANPOWER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,

PROVIDES AN ANSWER TO SIGNIFICANT NEGOTIATING ISSUES WHICH SEPARATE THE TWO SIDES IN A WAY WHICH IS MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. AS YOU POINT OUT, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOVIET ARMORED REDUCTIONS, IT WOULD ALSO CONSTITUTE A LOGICAL, PUBLICLY DEFENSIBLE TRADE-OFF OF "THREATENING ELEMENTS."

4. AFTER A CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF THE RELEVANT POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE ORIGINAL "OPTION III" PACKAGE PROPOSED BY THE US IN APRIL 1973 REMAINS THE BEST COMBINATION OF ELEMENTS TO UTILIZE IN PURSUIT OF OUR OBJECTIVES. TO RECAPITULATE, THE PACKAGE WOULD CONSIST OF:

-- 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS ASSOCIATED WITH US FORCES;

-- 36 US PERSHING SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS;

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-- 54 US NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT.

IN OUR VIEW, THIS PACKAGE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR PHASE I PROPOSALS REMAINS THE BEST MAKE-WEIGHT FOR REDUCING THE MANPOWER AND TANK ASYMMETRIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ACHIEVING THE ALLIED PHASE I OBJECTIVES OF WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, INCLUDING 68,000 MEN AND 1,700 TANKS, AND AGREEMENT TO THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON CEILING.

IT WOULD NOT DEGRADE NATO'S CAPABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF AND WOULD ASSURE THAT THE ALLIANCE RETAINED SUFFICIENT SURVIVABLE THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO PRECLUDE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON DETERRENCE. SHAPE HAS ALSO CONCLUDED THAT A TRADE INVOLVING THESE US NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND USSR TANKS IS MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE.

5. WE ALSO ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH YOUR ANALYSIS THAT OPTION III SHOULD BE PLAYED FOR BOTH THE COMMON CEILING AND THE REDUCTION OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY. IN ADVANCE OF A CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION TO OUR NUCLEAR PROPOSAL, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHAT VALUE THE WP WILL ASCRIBE TO IT. THUS, WE FEEL THE OFFER SHOULD BE ADVANCED IN PURSUIT OF BOTH OF OUR MAJOR PHASE I OBJECTIVES.

6. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN NEGOTIATING WITH THE EAST HAS CONVINCED US THAT IT IS PREFERABLE TO OFFER THE OPTION III PACKAGE IN TOTALITY AND IN SPECIFIC TERMS RATHER THAN TO OFFER IT UP PIECEMEAL, MOREOVER, WE SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE OFFER SHOULD BE MADE AS A PART OF PHASE I.

7. THERE ARE A FEW AREAS, HOWEVER, IN WHICH OUR CURRENT VIEWS DIFFER FROM THOSE TENTATIVELY EXPRESSED IN THE NETHERLANDS PAPER.

8. RECIPROCITY: FIRST, THE NETHERLANDS PAPER SEEMS TO ASSUME AN AUTOMATIC EXTENSION OF THE LIMITATIONS ON REDUCED ARMAMENTS TO ANALOGOUS SOVIET SYSTEMS, AND MORE BROADLY, TO ANALOGOUS NATO AND PACT SYSTEMS. SOME LIMITATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN THE AREA MUST BE IMPOSED TO PREVENT SOVIET INCREASES

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OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO UPSET THE MILITARY BALANCE RESULTING FROM THE NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES MOST THREATENING TO WESTERN EUROPE ARE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THE MORE STRINGENT THE CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ASKED BY THE WEST, THE MORE STRINGENT WOULD BE THE PROBABLE CONSTRAINT ON US TANKS SOUGHT BY THE EAST. SUCH LIMITS COULD PREVENT THE US FROM RESTORING ITS TANK STOCKS TO EARLIER LEVELS; HOWEVER, WE WOULD WANT TO ASSURE THAT THE AGREEMENT ALLOWS RESTORATION OF US TANK STOCKS TO THOSE LEVELS. WE DO NOT, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT ANY SUCH LIMITATION ON SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS NEED BE PARTICULARLY STRINGENT.

9. FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID

ANY COMMITMENT IN PHASE I TO EXPLICIT LIMITS ON ANALOGOUS ALLIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS (AND SHOULD RESIST EASTERN PRESSURE FOR SUCH LIMITS) THOUGH WE COULD POINT OUT THAT THE ALREADY OFFERED TEMPORARY NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS ON NATO GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED.

10. AIRCRAFT DEFINITIONS: YOUR PAPER ALSO RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF DENUCLEARIZING DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, RATHER THAN WITHDRAWING THEM FROM THE AREA. WE AGREE WITH THE UNDERLYING POINT--THAT ANY NATO EQUIPMENT OFFER SHOULD BE CLEARLY NUCLEAR IN NATURE.

11. HOWEVER, THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTION-"REMOVING AIRCRAFT FROM NUCLEAR ASSIGNMENT AND ELIMINATING ASSOCIATED NUCLEAR TRAINING AND WARHEAD STORAGE ACTIVITIES"-APPEARS TO US TO HAVE SOME SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGES. IT COULD INVITE CONTINUING EASTERN OVERSIGHT INTO NATO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS; AND IT WOULD REDUCE FLEXIBILITY BY REQUIRING WHOLE AIR BASES TO BE DENUCLEARIZED.

12. ON BALANCE, WE FAVOR EXPRESSING POST-REDUCTION AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS IN TERMS OF "NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT." IT WOULD BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT NON-SECRET

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NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN ANY WAY. (FOR INSTANCE, SEVERAL OF THE NEW AIRCRAFT ABOUT TO ENTER THE USAF INVENTORY ARE NOT NUCLEAR CAPABLE, INCLUDING THE F-15 AND A-10.) WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH WOULD SIMPLIFY NEGOTIATIONS BY EMPHASIZING THE OBJECTIVE CAPABILITIES OF PARTICULAR AIRCRAFT MODELS RATHER THAN THEIR ASSIGNMENT, AND, IN NEGOTIATING TERMS, MAINTAIN THE FOCUS ON ELEMENTS PERCEIVED AS THREATENING BY BOTH SIDES.

13. WARHEAD ISSUES: IN THE INTEREST OF PRESERVING WESTERN FLEXIBILITY, WE DO NOT INTEND TO ACCEPT ANY LIMITS ON US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF TYPES NOT REDUCED, SUCH AS ARTILLERY, SAMS, AND SSMS OF SIGNIFICANTLY SHORTER RANGE THAN PERSHING; AND WE WILL NOT ACCEPT

QUALITATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THOSE ELEMENTS UNDER LIMITATION. IN ADDITION, WE FEEL THAT ADMS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED UNDER THE RUBRIC OF WARHEADS RATHER THAN SEPARATELY. IN GENERAL, WE HAVE CONCLUDED

THAT WARHEADS REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED

WITH REDUCED DELIVERY SYSTEMS; WARHEADS SHOULD BE
CONSTRAINED SOLELY AS "US NUCLEAR WARHEADS" WITHOUT
FURTHER ELABORATION AS TO SPECIFIC SUBTYPES IN ORDER
TO PRESERVE FREEDOM TO MIX AMONG WARHEAD TYPES FOR
FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES.

14. CONCLUSIONS: AS THE FOREGOING DEMONSTRATES, WE
ARE IN SUBSTANTIAL ACCORD WITH THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT
ON THE MAJOR SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES PRESENTED BY OPTION III.
WE VALUE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE HAD THIS PRELIMINARY
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THEM ON THIS IMPORTANT BUT
THORNY ISSUE. AS WE PRESENT OUR ANALYSIS IN THE
ALLIANCE, WE WILL BE READY TO ELABORATE IN GREATER
DETAIL ON THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS INTERCHANGE.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, TEXT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY AGREEMENTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE132088
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ACDA/IR: LFISCHER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750197-0862
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750673/aaaacotp.tel
Line Count: 238
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 STATE 31553, 75 STATE 87907, 75 STATE A-103
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <22 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BFR: COMMENTS ON DUTCH PAPER ON OPTION III (NOTAL) SECRET
TAGS: PARM, NL, NATO, MBFR
To: THE HAGUE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006